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Abstract 
 
In this paper I delineate novel policy repercussions suggested by my research on “The New 
Economics of the Brain Drain.” In section 1, I provide a succinct account of the model that 
inspires the derivation of several new policy implications. In sections 2 through 5, I present 
the policy implications. I address the following questions: When and how can migration to a 
country substitute for educational subsidies in that country? Who should be admitted when 
the receiving country cares about the wellbeing of the unskilled workers who stay behind in 
the sending country? How and why the incentives to form human capital in the sending 
country will have a paradoxical effect on the migration policy of the receiving country? How 
and why will the level of a separating tax imposed by the destination country be reduced by 
the human capital formation calculus in the sending country? I conclude that the policy 
implications delineated in the paper illustrate the power and appeal of “The New Economics 
of the Brain Drain” as a framework for rethinking the formation of sound policy responses to 
migration. 
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In this paper I delineate novel policy repercussions yielded by my research on “The New 
Economics of the Brain Drain.” In section 1 I provide a succinct account of the model that 
inspires the derivation of new policy implications. In sections 2 through 5 I present the policy 
implications. 
 
1. The benchmark model of Stark and Wang (2002) 
 
Consider a small open economy without migration. The economy produces a single good, the 
price of which is normalized at 1. The large number of identical workers is a constant N. The 
worker’s twice-differentiable cost function of forming human capital is  () ck θ θ = , where θ is 
the worker’s human capital (the total sum of his efficiency units of labor), and  0 k >  is a 
constant. The economy-wide output is  () QN f θ = , where  () l n ( 1 ) l n ( 1 ) f θαθ ηθ = ++ + is the 
concave, per-worker production function,  k α >  is  a  constant,  θ  is  the  economy-wide 
average level of human capital, and  0 η >   represents the externalities accruing from the 
average level of human capital. Workers supply their human capital inelastically, having 
acquired it instantly, though not costlessly, at the beginning of their single-period life. 
Workers borrow the requisite funds to support the human capital formation at a zero rate of 
interest.  
 
Since labor is the only production input, the gross earnings per worker are simply equal 
to output per worker, that is: 
 
() l n ( 1 ) l n ( 1 ) f θαθ ηθ =+ ++       for  0 θ > .     (1) 
 
The coefficients α  and η  measure the private returns and the social returns of human 
capital, respectively. The objective of a worker is to maximize his net earnings, that is, his 
gross earnings minus the cost of forming human capital: 
 
() l n ( 1 ) l n ( 1 ) Wk θ αθ ηθ θ =+ ++ −      for  0 θ > .           (2) 






















), the worker’s chosen level of 





θ = −>.        ( 3 )  
 
From the assumption that there are N identical workers in the economy it follows that the 
average level of human capital in the economy is also 
* θ . Therefore, the net earnings per 
worker are: 
 
(* ) ( ) l n Wk
k
α
θα η α = +− +
 
.      (4) 
 
The following lemma will be helpful in subsequent analysis. 
 
Lemma: For any  1 x > ,  ln 1 x xx >− .  
 
Proof: Consider the function 
1 () l n ( ) .
x x zx xe
− =   We know that  (1) 0. z =  Since 





=   and applying the Lemma, it can be easily seen that  (* ) 0 W θ > . 
However, since the social returns to human capital are not internalized by the individual 
worker,  * θ  is not the socially optimal level of human capital. Only when the externalities that 
accrue from the economy-wide average level of human capital are taken into account, are the 
net earnings per worker socially maximized. To do so, we consider the function: 
 
() l n ( 1 ) l n ( 1 ) Wk θ αθ ηθ θ =+ ++ −  for  0 θ > .      (5) 
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= −>.      (6) 
 
Clearly, since  0 η > ,  ** * θ θ > . If a worker were to choose to form this level of human 
capital, his net earnings would be: 
 
(* * ) ( ) l n ( ) Wk
k
α η
θα η α η
+
= +− + + .   (7) 
 
Since  () (* * ) (* ) ( ) l n l n ( 1 ) WW x x x
α η
θθ α η η α
α
+




=> , it 
follows, upon applying the Lemma, that  (* * ) (* ) WW θ θ > . Net earnings per worker attained 
under the social planner’s choice of θ are higher than those achieved when workers choose 
how much human capital to form without taking into consideration the human capital 
externality. By construction,  (* * ) W θ   represents the highest net earnings per worker 
achievable, given the production technology. Unfortunately, in his optimization problem, an 
individual worker perceives the economy-wide average level of human capital only as a 
parameter that cannot be affected by his decisions; in a large economy, no individual can dent 
the average level of human capital. Thus, the prevailing level of human capital will be  * θ . 
 
Stark and Wang (2002) next introduce the possibility of a governmental intervention 
aimed at bringing the private optimal level of human capital to coincide with the social 
optimal level of human capital. They show that a strictly positive probability of migration to a 
technologically advanced destination country in which the returns to human capital are higher 
than in the home country increases the optimal level of human capital that individuals elect to 
acquire. The underlying idea is that higher expected returns to human capital away from home 
create an incentive to acquire more human capital at home. In the wake of the human capital - 4 - 
adjustment process, an individual either ends up as a higher skilled migrant worker in the 
technologically advanced country F, or he stays as a higher skilled worker in the home 
country, H. Country F’s production technology is given by  ˆ() l n ( 1 ) f C θβ θ = ++, where 
β αη >+ and  0 C ≥  are constant and exogenous to the model. Workers in H obtain the F-
country gross earnings with probability  0 p > . With probability 1 p −  they work in H with 
whatever human capital that they elected to form, obtaining gross earnings as per (1). The 
(risk neutral) worker’s expected gross earnings are therefore 
 
[ ] ( ) () l n ( 1 ) 1 l n ( 1 ) l n ( 1 ) Fp C p θβ θ α θη θ ⎡ ⎤ =+ + + − + + + ⎣ ⎦      (8) 
 
for  0 θ > , β αη >+, 0 p > , and  0 C ≥ . The function of the worker’s expected net earnings  
becomes 
 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ln( 1) 1 ln( 1) ln( 1) Wp C p k θ βθ αθ ηθ θ ⎡⎤ =+ + + − + + + − ⎣⎦
      (9) 
 









= −  .         ( 1 0 )  
 







        ( 1 1 )  
 
and 0* 1 p << , the government forges a “golden” result:  ** * θ θ =  ; individuals are lead out 
of their own accord to form the socially optimal level of human capital. Stark and Wang 
(2002) then show that when  * p p = , 0* 1 p < < , the level of wellbeing of all the individuals, 
both the ones who left and the ones who stay behind with more human capital that they would 
have formed in the absence of the migration prospect, is strictly higher than when  0 p = . - 5 - 
With this summary account of the basic model in place, I will now turn to a presentation 
of several examples, based on the average, of the model’s policy fallout. 
 
2. When and how can migration to a country substitute for  
educational subsidies in that country? 
 
2.1 From Stark and Wang (2002) we know that individuals form human capital that falls short 
of the socially optimal level of human capital. Assuming that all the individuals in a country 
are identical, this human capital formation must entail an average level of human capital that 
is lower than the socially optimal average level of human capital. By lowering, via 
educational subsidies, the cost of acquiring human capital, the human capital formed will be 
increased, that is, the average level of human capital will be raised. This is obvious. In the 
presence of migration to a country, what will the average level of human capital be in the 
country if it accepts migrants? If N  and  M  are the numbers of the natives and migrants, 
respectively, and if  N θ  and  M θ  are the levels of human capital of the natives and migrants 
























it follows that migration raises the average level of human capital if the migrants are better 
educated than the natives, thereby reducing the need to resort to educational subsidies. 
 
2.2 A simple average tale thus illustrates how migration, by boosting the average level of 
human capital in the receiving country, can reduce its need to resort to educational subsidies. 
The arrival of skilled migrant workers can crowd out subsidies aimed at inducing skill 
acquisition by native workers. - 6 - 
 
3. Who should be admitted when the receiving country cares about the wellbeing of the 
unskilled workers who stay behind in the sending country? 
 
3.1 Let labor be the only production input in the home country H. Let the output, hence the 
gross earnings, of any worker in H be an increasing function both of the worker’s own skill 
level and of the economy-wide average skill level. Let there be two types of workers: low-
ability unskilled workers, and high-ability skilled workers. Let the fractions of the two types 
be  1
2  each. Let the level of skill of the unskilled be θ , and let the level of skill of the skilled 
be 
* θ , where 
* θ θ > . The low-ability workers cannot acquire a skill level that is higher than 
θ . The high-ability workers can choose how much human capital to acquire. Let θ  be 






= . (13) 
 
Let the earnings of a worker whose skill level is  0 θ ≥  be higher in the developed country of 
destination, D, than in H. Let θ  neither depreciate nor appreciate upon migration, and let the 
employers in D discern θ  accurately and instantly upon a migrant’s arrival. Hence, any H 
country worker will be better off if he migrates to D. 
 
3.2 If a fraction of the unskilled leave, what will the effect be on those who stay behind? 
Suppose that  1
















7 2 , θ θ >  all those who stay behind gain by virtue of the new average skill level at H 
being higher. 
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3.3 Suppose, alternatively, that 1
4   of the skilled workers leave. Clearly, the consequent 
















7 2 θ θ <  (recalling (13)), the new average skill level is lower and every H country 
worker who stays behind will therefore be worse off. 
 
In a static framework, a D country that cares about the wellbeing of the unskilled workers 
who stay behind at H, if faced with a choice of either admitting unskilled workers from H or 
skilled workers from H, will thus want to admit unskilled workers from H. 
 
3.4 But suppose that, in line with the “New Economics of the Brain Drain” (Stark, 2005), we 
have a dynamic setting: the prospect of migrating to D induces the skilled (high-ability) 
workers to acquire more human capital, 
** θ , such that 
** * 4
3 θ θε = + , where ε  is any positive 
number, however small: instead of studying, say, three years of engineering, the high-ability 
workers study a little bit more than four. Then, not only will the unskilled who stay behind 
gain from the migration of the skilled, they will gain more than they would have gained if  1
4  
of the unskilled migrated. If 
** * 4
3 θ θε =+ , then the new average level of human capital at H 
will be 
 














3 , θ θ >  the unskilled who stay behind will indeed gain more. 
 
3.5 The lesson to be drawn from this back-of-the-envelope exercise is that the migration 
policy of a benevolent D cannot be oblivious to the incentives that the policy triggers, to 
responses to that policy, and to the impact of those responses on the wellbeing of those who 
stand to be affected by the policies indirectly. - 8 - 
 
4. How and why the incentives to form human capital in the sending country will have a 
paradoxical effect on the migration policy of the receiving country? 
 
4.1 Let there be n workers in H: 2
n  low-ability workers with skill level  2 θ = , and 2
n  high-
ability workers with skill level 
* 6 θ = , such that skill level 
* θ   was formed when the 
probability of migration to D was 1
4 . The skill level θ  was formed independently of the 
probability of migration and cannot be affected by (changes in) that probability. Country D is 
not able to decipher the skill levels of individual migrant workers; it can only decide on the 
numbers that it admits. At the outset, the average skill level at H, θ , is 4, as is the average 
skill level of the migrant workers, assuming that the shares of the workers of the two skill 
types in a migration flow are the same as their shares in the population of H. 
 
4.2 Let D seek to have the average skill level of the migrants at a level higher than 4, indeed, 
higher than 5, which is the current average level of human capital at D. If D could select, it 
would admit only those whose skill level is 6, thereby achieving its objective. But it cannot. 
So let us consider the effect if D increases the probability of migration from 1
4  to, say,  1
2  
such that, as a consequence, while those whose skill level is θ  do not acquire any additional 
human capital, the high-ability workers now acquire 62ε + +  units of human capital: instead 
of studying, say, six semesters of engineering, the high-ability workers now study a little bit 
more than eight. The new average level of human capital of the migrants (like that of those 






ε ε ++ +
= +> . (17) 
 
Thus, D benefits, the unskilled workers who stay behind benefit (since  2 54 ε +>), and the 
skilled workers who migrate benefit (assuming that they expose their 62ε + +  units of human 
capital to a better paid environment at D). If the skilled workers who stay behind are also 
better off, then everyone is better off. 
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Note that raising the probability of migration from 1
4  to  1
2   entails a doubling of the 
numbers of both skilled and unskilled migrants. 
 
4.3 A lesson to be drawn from this back-of-the-envelope exercise is that the dynamic 
consequences of a migration policy could lead to a policy that appears somewhat paradoxical: 
in order to overcome the adverse repercussions of the presence of unskilled workers in the 
incoming migration flow, more unskilled workers have to be admitted. 
 
5. How and why will the level of a separating tax imposed by the destination country be 
reduced by the human capital formation calculus in the sending country? 
 
5.1 Consider an asymmetric information setting. Both the low-ability unskilled workers and 
the high-ability skilled workers find it advantageous to migrate, since the average of their 
earnings in the destination country D, 1
2 (20 100) 60 + = , is higher than their type-specific 
earnings in their home country, H, which are 10 and 30, respectively. If D resorts to an entry 
tax as its instrument of migration control, and if D seeks to have only the skilled come in, it 
will need to impose a tax of 50 ε + ; the unskilled workers will then stay behind, while the 
skilled, left with post-tax earnings of 100 (50 ) 50 ε ε − +=− , will still find it advantageous to 
migrate. There is, though, no apparent reason not to impose a higher tax on the skilled; 
indeed, they will still come even if the tax is as high as 70 ε − . Thus, D will seek happily to 
levy this higher entry tax, filling its coffers with the maximal tax revenue. However, such a 
policy ignores the effect of the tax on the very incentive to acquire skills: when faced with 
relatively low earnings in D, the high-ability workers in H will elect to acquire only a 
correspondingly low skill level, their productivity will be lower, and they will receive lower 
pay - say 80. But then, if it is desirable for D to have skilled workers from H coming in, 
70 ε −  will not be feasible (incentive compatible).  
 
5.2 This example illustrates why the choice of an entry tax aimed at separating the skilled 
from the unskilled cannot be independent of the response of the skilled to the incentive to 
acquire skills which, in turn, is affected by the level of the tax. Put differently, the choice of 
the level of a migration entry tax by D cannot be de-linked from the human capital formation 
calculus at H. - 10 - 
 





The policy implications delineated in this paper constitute examples from the average. Even 
such a simple set suffices to illustrate the power and appeal of “The New Economics of the 
Brain Drain.” Hopefully, the implications will stimulate further thinking and discussion 
leading to sound policy responses to migration. - 11 - 
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